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The Choice of Organizational Form:
Vertical Integration versus other Methods of Vertical Control
Abstract
Vertical integration is a fundamental corporate strategy of interest to the fields of
strategic management and organizational economics. This paper synthesizes theoretical arguments
and empirical findings from this literature to identify the underlying advantages and
disadvantages of choosing a vertical integration strategy. It then suggests that these arguments
can be put into a broader framework with vertical financial ownership and vertical contracting
being seen as essentially isomorphic phenomena. The key theoretic question involves predicting
when market mechanisms are sufficient, when intermediate forms of vertical contracting become
necessary, and when formal vertical integration is the preferred strategic alternative. The
concluding section of the paper provides a framework for making this analysis based on a
synthesis of agency and transaction cost perspectives.

The Choice of Organizational Form:
Vertical Integration versus other Methods of Vertical Control
Although economists and strategic management researchers recognize that there are many
possible motives for vertical integration (Arrow, 1975; Harrigan, 1983), there has not been a
systematic synthesis of the considerable body of literature in the field of industrial organization
and strategy on this important strategic option. A unified conceptual framework is a particularly
important foundation for further research from a strategic management perspective, since this
field draws its strength from integrative research approaches (Bowman, 1989; Huff, 1981;
Jemison, 1981). This paper therefore suggests a general theory for predicting and prescribing
vertical integration that integrates and extends previous work done under both the strategy and
industrial organization paradigms. Although there are some discrepancies in the way vertical
integration is described and investigated in these literatures, the basic argument is that the
literature on vertical integration has in fact been complementary.
The disadvantages of complete financial ownership suggest that corporate strategy
research should examine more carefully the alternative governance structures of vertical control,
including long-term contracts, joint ventures, networks, and franchising. The second section of
the paper illustrates the isomorphic nature of vertical control via contracting compared with
complete financial ownership via vertical merger. It is proposed as a general theorem that every
motive for vertical merger may be achieved alternatively by an appropriate vertical contract,
when transaction costs are absent. Although theories of vertical financial ownership thus can be
described more generally as theories of vertical control, we are still left with the task of
predicting and prescribing which form organizational control will take. Put differently, the
formulation of vertical integration strategies (Harrigan, 1984) needs to be supplanted by a more
general discussion of strategies to effectively achieve corporate control objectives. The last
section of the paper advances a general theory for explaining and predicting the pattern of
vertical integration and vertical contracting in different environments which draws on both a
transaction cost perspective and on agency theory.
The Advantages of Vertical Integration
An exhaustive review of the economic and strategy literature (Mahoney, 1989) suggests
that the motives for vertical integration may be classified into the four major categories shown in
Table I: (1) transaction cost considerations; (2) strategic considerations; (3) output and/or input
price advantages; and (4) uncertainties in costs and/or prices.
Insert Table 1 about here
While no firm will be motivated by all of these potential advantages, taken as a whole they
illustrate the broad utility of this corporate option, a usefulness that justifies greater theoretical
and empirical attention than has been given to vertical integration strategies to date.
Transaction Cost Considerations . Vertical integration is often chosen to minimize the cost
of transactions (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985), costs which include negotiating, adapting,
monitoring, and enforcing buyer-supplier relationships (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). A good
example of the potential cost savings of vertical merger is the avoidance of sales taxes when arms-
length contracting is replaced by internal transfers (Coase, 1937). More subtly, vertically
integrated petroleum firms have found it profitable to increase the price of crude oil relative to
the price of final products in order to shift as much of their reported earnings as possible to the
raw materials extraction stage, which enjoys tax preferences associated with resource depletion
(Bolch & Damon, 1978). Similar strategies can be found in other basic conversion industries such
as copper, aluminum and steel (Scherer, 1980).
A second fundamental motive for vertical integration is the failure of markets to
satisfactorily handle certain transactions (Casson, 1984). Important sources of market failures
include externalities (Dahlman, 1979), increasing returns and sunk costs (Baumol, Panzar & Willig,
1982) and market imperfections (Wolf, 1979; Yao, 1988). These market frictions violate the
standard assumptions of competitive equilibrium models. Prices are no longer sufficient statistics.
Long-term relational contracts (Macneil, 1980), joint ventures (Harrigan, 1988; Hennart, 1988a;
Kogut, 1988), franchising (John, 1984; Norton, 1988; Rubin, 1978), networks (Thorelli, 1986;
Jarillo, 1988), quasi-firms (Eccles, 1981) and vertical financial ownership (Harrigan, 1983;
Williamson, 1971) are some of the "institutions of capitalism" (Williamson, 1985) which emerged
in response to the inadequacies of classical market contracting.
Williamson's (1985) seminal research develops a well-grounded theoretical framework for
explaining and predicting this market failure. The basic idea is that contractual difficulties arise
when opportunistic agents (Anderson, 1988; Maitland, Byrson & Van De Ven, 1985) engage in
frequent transactions in an environment of sufficient uncertainty and/or complexity to surpass
bounded rationality capabilities (Simon, 1978). The risk of self-interested agents utilizing
asymmetric information to their advantage is high in such environments and vertical financial
ownership is one response to this inadequacy of classical market contracting (Harrigan, 1983;
Williamson, 1975). Contractual problems become acute when there are small numbers
bargaining, a situation that occurs when transactions involve human, physical or site "asset
specificity" (Spiller, 1985; Williamson, 1979). Human asset specificity involves uniquely related
learning processes or teamwork. Physical asset specificity includes requirements for specialized
machine tools and equipment. Site specificity occurs when unique locational advantages exist, as,
for example, when a power plant is located near a coal mine to save on transportation costs
(Joskow, 1985a). Vertical integration can assure requisite inputs in such situations and the
importance of asset specificity in explaining and predicting vertical financial ownership is
supported by a large body of literature including case studies (Butler & Carney, 1983; Globerman
& Schwindt, 1986; Goldberg & Erickson, 1987; Hennart 1988b; Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 1978;
Palay, 1984; Stuckey, 1983; Teece, 1976), formal modeling (Kleindorfer & Knieps, 1982; Masten,
1982; Riordan & Williamson, 1985) and statistical testing (Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984; Armour
& Teece, 1980; Caves & Bradburd, 1988; John & Weitz, 1988; Joskow, 1985a; Levy, 1985;
MacDonald, 1985; MacMillan, Hambrick & Pennings, 1986; Masten, 1984; Monteverde & Teece,
1982; Walker & Weber, 1984, 1987).
A last important transaction cost motive for vertical integration involves economies of
scope (Baumol, Panzar, & Willig, 1982; Teece 1980; Williamson, 1975), including technological
complementarities (Bain, 1968). The standard example of vertical merger to achieve economies of
scope is found in the integration of iron and steel production (Lavington, 1927). An example of
major technological interdependency can be found between equipment manufacturing and
operations in the telecommunications industry (Phillips, 1983). Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982)
maintain that economies of scope are a sufficient condition for vertical integration. However, as
Teece (1980) has emphasized, economies of scope do not explain the "scope of the enterprise".
Strategic Considerations . In addition to transaction cost considerations, the enterprise may
achieve strategic advantages via vertical integration. Vertical integration is frequently cited, for
example, as a means of increasing barriers to entry (Bain, 1968; Porter, 1980). When entry into
two separate stages of production is already difficult because of large capital requirements,
combining successive stages will further raise entry barriers, because new entrants must enter two
stages rather than one. Vertical integration has the potential disadvantage of also being a major
source of exit barriers (Harrigan 1985b), but exit barriers themselves may play a compensating
positive role if they constitute additional barriers against prospective entrants (Porter, 1980).
A motive related to entry barriers is the strategy of "price squeezing" (Joskow, 1985b).
Vertical integration may enable a firm to eliminate competition by lowering the price of the
output while simultaneously raising the price of the input. Edwards (1953) contended, for
example, that the price of crude oil was raised and the price of gasoline was lowered to such a
degree via vertical integration that the independent refiner could not operate. Adams (1964)
similarly argued that the large integrated steel companies utilized a price squeeze to eliminate
smaller, less integrated competitors.
Vertical integration may be used strategically not only in an environment of intense
competition, but in regulated environments as well. If a firm is subject to effective rate-of-
return regulation in the final stage of production but is permitted to integrate backward, for
example, it may be able to avoid the effect of the regulatory constraint by transfer pricing the
intermediate product above marginal cost (Dayan, 1975).
Vertical integration can even promote oligopoly by improving the monitoring necessary to
maintain coordination. Adelman (1972) suggested that vertical integration into refining by the
highly concentrated crude oil suppliers enhanced stability of coordination by making it more
difficult for an oligopolist to plan secretly to increase market share. Since there were few
significant independent refiners, no company could increase its output of crude oil without first
building refineries and distribution systems which clearly signaled their plans to competitors.
Vertical integration thus may evolve as a means of maintaining oligopolistic discipline and may
provide mobility barriers (Caves & Porter, 1977) which sustain the stability of strategic groups
(McGee & Thomas, 1986; Newman, 1978). Differences between existing firms in their degree of
vertical integration appear to have led to difficulties in agreement on the desirable vertical price
structure. Even more problematic, changes in vertical integration structure can increase the
threat of entry as it has in steel (Adams & Dirlam, 1964), petroleum (de Chazeau & Kahn, 1959),
and aluminum (Scherer, 1980).
Output and Input Price Discrepancies . If output and input prices are not given to the
firm, then there are several possible explanations for vertical integration. In the successive
monopoly case, Spengler (1950) considers a product that passes through three successive stages of
production before being ready for sale to consumers. Each stage of production contains sufficient
monopoly power to charge a price above the competitive level. Here, a vertically integrated firm
controlling all three stages of production can earn a larger profit than can be obtained by the
"myopic chain monopoly" (Greenhut & Ohta, 1976). The essential idea is that the vertically
integrated producer can evade the monopoly prices imposed by upstream firms.
In the case of bilateral monopoly (Machlup and Taber, 1960), vertical integration
facilitates arriving at the input choice consistent with joint profit maximization under non-
integrated bilateral monopoly (Williamson, 1975). Internal organization minimizes strategic
bargaining and resolves the conflict of the division of profits. The problem of firms being
"locked in" to a vertical relationship is not uncommon (Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 1978).
Vertical integration minimizes appropriation risk (Barney, 1986; Walker, 1988).
In the case of an upstream monopoly, if there exists a variable-proportions technology
(Warren-Boulton, 1978) for the final product, vertical merger permits the integrated firm to
achieve efficiency in factor utilization. As a first approximation these cost savings accrue as
additional profits to the integrating monopolist (Mallela & Nahata, 1980; McGee & Bassett, 1976;
Schmalensee, 1973; Vernon & Graham, 1971; Waterson, 1982). Abiru (1988) extends this stream
of literature to include the more empirically relevant case of variable-proportions technology and
successive oligopolies.
The price discrimination incentives for vertical integration can be elucidated by the
example of an intermediate good monopolist selling to two downstream competitive industries.
The upstream monopolist can increase profits by selling the intermediate product at a lower price
to the downstream firm with the relatively higher price sensitivity (Perry, 1978). Vertical
integration by the upstream monopolist can eliminate incentives for arbitrage of the intermediate
product between the downstream firms. Perry (1980) contends that forward integration by Alcoa
in the period 1888-1930 was inspired by price discrimination. Alcoa integrated into the relatively
more price sensitive markets, such as cookware (Hale, 1967).
' Crandall (1968) submits that Ford's expansion into competitive components markets
similarly was motivated by the desire to price discriminate. Ford purchased Auto-Lites battery
plant and obtained more revenue from those who used their vehicle the most (Weintraub, 1949).
Asset specificity of parts and economies of scale in producing repair parts also tend to lock
customers in with an automobile manufacturer.
Uncertain Costs and Prices . Vertical integration is a potential response to the stochastic
elements confronting the firm. Arrow (1975) examined uncertainty in the supply price of the
upstream good by focusing on asymmetric information between parties at the upstream and
downstream stages. A downstream firm has the incentive to purchase one or more upstream firms
because this improves its pricing forecast and thus its ability to purchase the appropriate level of
capital. Carlton (1979) presents a similar model in which both output and input firms face
uncertainty in demand and firms must make decisions concerning price and production before
actual demand is observable. In this case there is some risk of supply failure to the customer as
well as risk to the seller of overproduction. Vertical integration is a means of transferring this
risk. Firms integrate to ensure a supply of input for their "high probability" demand and continue
to purchase their "low probability" demand.
Green (1986) presents a model in which the price in the intermediate market is fixed so
that fluctuations in external demand for the intermediate product results in rationing of either
upstream or downstream firms. Integration allows the combined firm to avoid rationing, and thus
avoid demand uncertainty.
While the strategy literature tends to agree on many of the potential advantages of vertical
integration that have been given more detailed attention in the organizational economics
literature, two points of apparent disagreement concern demand uncertainty and technological
uncertainty. It is a time honored tradition in the economics literature to argue that vertical
integration is motivated by the attempt to assure supply (Dennison, 1939; Frank", 1925;
Willoughby, 1901) and to avoid the risk of foreclosure of markets (Allen, 1971; Grimm & Harris,
1983). Several empirical studies have supported the hypothesis that demand or volume
uncertainty leads to increased vertical integration (Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984; Levy, 1985;
Walker & Weber, 1984, 1987). Levin (1981) found, for example, that vertical integration into
crude production for oil refining in the 1948-1972 period reduced the variance of profits. Recent
work in the strategy field by Harrigan (1985a, 1986) however, yielded a negative relationship
between demand uncertainty and the vertical integration strategy.
I submit that the Williamsonian view that uncertainty leads to greater vertical integration
and the Harrigan view that uncertainty leads to less vertical integration can be reconciled.
Williamson's statement is a conventional comparative statics argument that if the level of asset
specificity remains constant , then an increase in uncertainty increases the likelihood of vertical
integration. Harrigan, on the other hand, is analyzing the effect of uncertainty in a dynamic
contingency framework that incorporates the dimensions of stages, breadth, degree and form of
integration. To translate Harrigan's view in Williamson's terms: an increase in uncertainty may
lead a firm to utilize less firm-specific assets. In consequence, less vertical integration would
obtain in the long-run. But this does not contradict Williamson, who only argues that vertical
integration will increase (under uncertainty) if asset specificity remains constant.
Vertical integration may also be an adaptive response to the problems of measurement
uncertainty (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). In particular, shirking problems in team production
induces vertical integration (Jones, 1984). When output depends on joint efforts, individuals have
the incentive to "free-ride" in hopes of receiving greater reward than their efforts would
otherwise dictate. Empirical studies are consistent with the hypothesis that measurement
uncertainty of this type leads to vertical integration (Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984; Anderson,
1985).
Measurement uncertainty and quality uncertainty are also important factors that lead to
performance ambiguity (Jones, 1987). The need to reduce quality uncertainty for key inputs may
spur backward integration, while the need to assure point-of-sale service, which is often critical
for new products, may necessitate forward integration (Harrigan, 1986).
Finally, the problem of technological uncertainty (Hennart, 1982; Teece, 1982) and the
trading of technological knowledge may lead to vertical integration (Arrow, 1971). Here again an
apparent disagreement can be found in the literature. Armour and Teece (1980) argued that the
strong relationship between research intensity and vertical integration in the petroleum industry
was due to market failures in information exchange. However, Harrigan (1986) and Walker &
Weber (1984, 1987) found that technological uncertainty was associated with less vertical
integration. The resolution of apparent disagreement here requires care to not confound asset
specificity and uncertainty. If technological uncertainty leads to the utilization of more flexible
(less firm-specific or product-specific) technologies, a link suggested by Balakrishnan and
Wernerfelt's (1986) model, then less vertical integration obtains.
The problems of recognition, disclosure, team organization and dissipation that are
involved in contracting under technological uncertainty all suggest a decision to vertically
integrate (Caves, 1982; Teece, 1982). The effect of technological uncertainty on vertical
integration may be especially influenced by the coordination costs of contracting for many parts
in a system. Monteverde and Teece (1982) argued that the automobile electrical system involved
substantial interdependencies and were consequently produced in-house. The Walker and Weber
(1984, 1987) automobile studies could be updated to consider these system coordination influences
on the technological uncertainty—vertical integration linkage.
An Overview of Vertical Integration as a Corporate Strategy
Uncertainty can take many forms.
(i) Parametric or structural (Langlois, 1984).
(ii) perceptual or market based (Downey, Hellriegel, & Slocum, 1975).
(iii) volume, measurement, quality, or technological.
In the absence of any of these uncertainties, the firm need not exist (Coase, 1937; Knight, 1921;
Williamson, 1975). As uncertainty increases, not only is the firm called into existence, there are
increasing arguments for expanding the scope of organizational activity through vertical
integration. More specifically, the same arguments found in the basic theory of the firm (Coase,
1988; Penrose, 1959) can be extended to justify vertical integration as a corporate form (Harrigan,
1983; Williamson, 1975).
To ascertain the effect of increased "uncertainty" on vertical integration, however,
researchers must specify the nature of the uncertainty, the context of the analysis (static or
dynamic), and the interaction of uncertainty with other important variables such as asset
specificity (Anderson, 1985; Walker & Weber, 1984). Clearly, the economic and strategy
literature has offered an impressive menu of advantages for the corporate strategy of vertical
integration. But what are the advantages of vertical integration that are generalizable?
(1) Profit. Vertical integration may most effectively achieve the profit incentive since
preemptive claims on profits between separate firms are eliminated.
(2) Coordination. The firm has better control of opportunistic behavior due to the
authority relationship (Dow, 1987) within the firm. Managers of the divisions can be required to
cooperate and promotions can be adjusted to achieve such behavior.
(3) Audit and Resource Allocation. The auditing powers of the firm are superior to the
auditing capabilities of contracting parties (Williamson, 1975). A firm has the legal right to audit
its divisions but no right to audit outside contractors. Integrated firms have superior information
upon which they can base allocations to their divisions so that the incentive for those divisions to
use their information strategically (to the detriment of the enterprise's profits) is eliminated
(Crocker, 1983). Furthermore, improved information enables the firm to allocate personnel to
tasks more effectively.
(4) Motivation. A fourth advantage of the vertically integrated firm comes from the
quasi-moral involvement that may develop within its boundaries. Particularly successful
organizations inculcate an ungroundable but vital sense of human solidarity, and these clan-like
emotions can have positive productivity impacts (Ouchi, 1980). Equity and due process develops
in internal labor markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) and institutional and personal trust relations
evolve. Selection, training, and socialization may minimize the divergence of preferences of team
members (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1980).
(5) Communication. A fifth advantage of the vertically integrated firm is the
development of a coding system which increases communication efficiencies. The standardization
of language is seen in accounting systems and other reporting systems. Admittedly, these
economies could be obtained via recurrent contracting but the efficiencies of the coding may be
impaired due to the risk of opportunism. Firms are arguably better than markets in
communicating and coding respects because the hazards of opportunism are mitigated due to
superior auditing and greater incentive harmony within firms. The upshot is that firms (within
capacity limits) have an information processing advantage, and this advantage complements
superior auditing capabilities (Sandler & Cauley, 1980). In summary, when a firm vertically
integrates, ownership changes (Grossman & Hart, 1986), incentives change, and governance
structures (ability to monitor and reward) change.
Disadvantages of Vertical Integration
While the economics literature has been particularly strong in articulating the advantages
of vertical integration, it has given far less attention to the disadvantages of the vertical
integration strategy. Due to the strong simplifying assumptions made by most economists
concerning the cognitive and informational capabilities of a firm's workers and managers,
implementation problems in particular have been either neglected or suppressed. Strategic
management researchers, on the other hand, have begun to focus on the implementation problems
of vertical merger and have provided an analysis which is complementary to the economics
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literature.
The disadvantages of vertical integration, summarized in Table 2, may be classified under
four major categories: (1) bureaucratic costs; (2) strategic costs; (3) production costs; and (4)
long-run dynamic costs.
Insert TABLE 2 about here
Bureaucratic costs . Implementation costs of integration have proved to have particularly
important negative effects, especially because they are so difficult to anticipate. Vertical merger
increases the size of an organization which often results in additional hierarchical levels.
Increasing size and bounded spans of control imply greater distance of most subordinates from
their ultimate superiors. This may lead to communication distortion due to serial reproduction
loss and/or deliberate distortion to achieve divisional objectives (Calvo & Wellisz, 1978; Coase,
1988; Cremer, 1980; Williamson, 1967) thus obviating a major advantage of integration.
The loss of high powered market incentives suggests that internal organization may also be
more costly than the market mechanism (Williamson, 1985), undercutting the profit incentive for
integration. One explanation is that the lack of direct competitive pressures on the cost of the
intermediate products may allow increasing levels of slack (Cyert & March, 1963) and thus
reduce profitability.
As firms vertically integrate away from the base business, they are also likely to become
involved in new manufacturing or selling tasks. Managing at the manufacturing and distribution
stages requires different skills than previously required by the firms only in upstream or
downstream operations and inexperience may lead to comparatively high internal costs (Harrigan,
1985c; Porter, 1980). In short, the synergies created through vertical integration may be
overestimated and do not compensate for higher costs (Harrigan, 1984).
Strategic costs . While Arrow (1975) suggested that vertical integration may eliminate the
problem of asymmetric information, the flip side of the argument has been suggested by Harrigan
(1984), namely that vertical integration may result in a loss of access to information and tacit
11
knowledge as relationships with experienced and more broadly based distributorships are severed.
A second potential strategic cost to vertical integration is that the firm purchases specialized assets
that increase sunk costs and may lead to chronic excess capacity and low profitability (Baumol,
Panzar & Willig, 1982; Chandler, 1962; Rumelt, 1974). Third, vertical integration may link a
firm to a weak adjacent industry (Harrigan, 1984) with an attendant loss in profitability. Fourth,
vertical integration may decrease a firm's strategic flexibility and lead to high exit barriers
(Harrigan, 1985d).
Production costs . Walker & Weber (1984) suggest that production costs are critical in the
make-or-buy decision. A vertically integrated firm that does not utilize a sufficient amount of
the input to achieve minimum efficient scale will be at a cost disadvantage against firms that
contract out to an efficient supplier achieving full economies of scale (Stigler, 1968). Second,
obsolete processes may be perpetuated with vertical integration (Harrigan, 1984). Third, vertical
integration may lead to a capital drain, a potential problem that is particularly damaging to
smaller firms (Williamson, 1975). Fourth, capacity imbalance in the vertically integrated firm
may lead to higher production costs than incurred by firms that utilize market mechanisms (Hayes
& Wheelwright, 1984).
Long-run dynamic costs . The make-or-buy decision also must take into account
possible long-run costs. Internal organization may lead to inefficiency if, for example, internal
divisions face no competitive pressures for procurement. Even if outside sources exist as a
potential disciplining influence, they may be bypassed due to bureaucratic considerations.
Second, a norm of reciprocity between divisions easily develops (Gouldner, 1960), and over time
the benefits of reducing transaction costs are lost. Third, internal production may lead to an
expansionary bias that compromises cost minimization (Williamson, 1975). Fourth, psychological
commitment and administrative difficulties of divestment (Duhaime & Grant, 1984; Duhaime &
Schwenk, 1985) are important dynamic costs that need to be considered in the make-or-buy
decision.
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The Isomorphic Nature of Vertical
Integration and Vertical Contracting
While the possible strategic advantages of vertical integration are many, it is clear that the
strategic costs of vertical integration may outweigh the benefits. Consequently, firms should be
highly motivated to search for less costly methods of achieving the benefits of vertical control. It
now will be argued that vertical contracting (i.e. exclusive dealing, resale price maintenance,
exclusive territories, etc.) is a viable alternative to vertical financial ownership (Flaherty, 1981).
In fact, in the absence of transaction costs, vertical contracting can replicate the advantages of
vertical financial ownership.
The key argument is that the various motives provided for vertical integration (i.e. vertical
financial ownership) just derived from the competitive strategy and economics literature, can be
directly generalized to become arguments for vertical control and applied inter alia to long-term
contracts, networking, equity joint ventures, as well as vertical integration. While written
explicitly as theories of vertical integration, and analyzed as such in the previous section, this
work can be read in a more general way as providing a theoretic foundation for explaining why
the enterprise desires vertical control.
To illustrate the point that much of the vertical integration literature can be read in the
more general terms of vertical control, research on vertical integration is matched with literature
discussing other forms of vertical control in Table 3. A necessary difference between alternative
forms of vertical control is the transaction costs involved. Table 3 thus ignores transaction costs,
but considers the other three key advantages of vertical integration first summarized in Table 1.
Insert Table 3 about here
Table 3 suggests, for example, that vertical integration is not the only way of creating
entry barriers. Exclusive territories, exclusive dealer arrangements, long-term contracts and
vertical price-fixing (resale price maintenance) may be used as strategic entry barriers (Aghion &
Bolton, 1987; Comanor & Freeh, 1985) in ways that are very similar to the protection created by
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vertical integration. In both cases, firms monopolize the downstream (or upstream) market and
thus raise rival's costs (Krattenmaker & Salop, 1986; Salop & Scheffman, 1983).
The regulated firm similarly need not have full vertical integration to avoid rate-of-return
regulation. Transfer pricing via quasi-integration would suffice (Blois, 1972). If vertical control
is needed to maintain an oligopolistic pricing structure, tying contracts have been expressly used
for this purpose (Burstein, 1960a).
Moving to input and/or output price discrepancies as a motive for vertical integration,
alternative vertical constraints such as exclusive territories, exclusive dealing, franchise fees,
resale price maintenance and/or forcing tie-in purchases also may be used to maintain control.
The general argument is that promotional efforts, determination of final price, and uses of
technology are important decisions frequently made by the downstream firm (retailer) that
influence the profitability of the upstream firm (manufacturer). The upstream firm has a strong
incentive to control the downstream firm's decisions, but this control can be achieved in many
ways.
In the successive monopoly case, a franchise fee or resale price maintenance, where the
manufacturer mandates that the dealer cannot exceed the profit-maximizing price, replicates the
vertical integration outcome (Blair & Kaserman, 1983; Rey & Tirole, 1986). In the case of
bilateral monopoly, Machlup and Taber (1960) argued that if two separate firms bargain about
price and quantity, they could achieve joint profit maximization without vertical integration
being required. Burstein (1960a) explored the variable proportions incentive for vertical
integration and argued that the upstream monopolist could obtain identical results by tying the
purchase of the nonmonopolized substitute inputs to the purchase of the intermediate product
over which the monopolist has control.
Price discrimination could be achieved by tying arrangements rather than vertical
integration (Blair & Kaserman, 1983; Burstein 1960b). For example, companies have tied staplers
to stapling machines, rivets to riveting machines, computer cards to computers, and paper supplies
to electrofax copying machines (Blackstone, 1975). Territorial restrictions coupled with resale
price maintenance could also facilitate price discrimination (Phillips & Mahoney, 1985).
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The final key advantage comes from uncertainties about costs and/or prices. In the case
of asymmetric upstream information (Arrow, 1975) auxiliary markets might convey the
information without vertical integration. Arrow assumes, however, that upstream producers will
have severe difficulties in selling information, which may or may not hold true empirically.
Second, he assumes that a forward-contract cannot be written that would enable downstream
firms to make correct investment decisions (Teece, 1980). If these conditions do not hold, vertical
integration may still be the strategy of choice.
In the Carlton (1979) model the analysis of vertical integration explicitly refers to either
long-term contract or vertical integration. Thus, in Carlton's view, the desire to shed risk by
itself does not provide a powerful incentive for vertical integration. Firms concerned with the
supply of an input (Walker & Weber, 1984) could write contracts which include a large penalty
such as holding hostages (Williamson, 1983), collateral (Benjamin, 1978), or deferred rebates,
performance bonds and liquidated damage provisions (Goldberg, 1979; Telser, 1980).
In terms of product quality and service, Harrigan (1986) persuasively argues that new
pioneering products and high quality differentiated products require vertical integration to insure
that quality is maintained through the linkages of the value-added chain (Anderson & Coughlan,
1987; Walker, 1988). A manufacturer can use forward integration to differentiate his product by
providing a higher level of service at the distribution level than would an independent distributor
(Coughlan, 1985; Etgar, 1978). However, manufacturers of new products frequently use vertical
contracts to achieve the same objective. For example, the manufacturer may use exclusive
territories or resale price maintenance to achieve high quality service. By reducing price
competition, the manufacturer induces the retailers to compete on service and other nonprice
terms. Vertical price-fixing contracts between the manufacturer and retailers mitigates free-rider
problems (Goldberg, 1984; Oster, 1984; Telser, 1960) by eliminating discounters and enabling the
manufacturer to signal quality via retail endorsement (Klein & Murphy, 1988; Marvel &
McCafferty, 1984; Phillips & Mahoney, 1985). This seems to have been the rationale explaining
resale price maintenance for high quality products such as Lenox china and Magnavox televisions
(Goldberg, 1982), Sony electronics, Florsheim shoes, and London Fog and Misty Harbor raincoats
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(Overstreet, 1983).
Similarly, exclusive territories and resale price maintenance provide incentives for
retailers to offer services to the customer on behalf of the manufacturer, and exclusive dealing
provides incentives for the manufacturer to undertake promotional services that benefit the
retailers (Marvel, 1982). In short, the problem of shirking (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Jones,
1984) may be solved by relational contracting (Williamson, 1979) as well as by incorporation.
Researchers have maintained that vertical integration is an institutional response to
technological uncertainty (Teece, 1982), to the difficulty of trading information (Arrow, 1971),
and to internalize externalities such as R & D spillovers (Phillips, 1983). Vertical integration also
is suggested as a means of protecting value-creating aspects of proprietary products or process
technology (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). However, internal organization may not be necessary to
alleviate these problems. Joint ventures, for example, are often a sufficient organizational
response to minimize the difficulties inherent in technology transfer (Hennart, 1988a; Kogut,
1988).
All of these insights on the complementarity of vertical integration and other forms of
vertical control such as contracts, exclusive territories and joint ventures can be expressed more
generally in terms of agency theory. This perspective (Eisenhardt, 1989; Oviatt 1988) suggests
that a vertical contract can always be written to achieve the vertical integration outcome (Evans &
Grossman, 1983) when we ignore the problems of bounded rationality and transaction costs. In
fact, vertical contracts represent one of the most obvious applications of agency theory
(Mathewson & Winter, 1984; Rey & Tirole, 1986).
More broadly, the agency perspective provides the necessary theoretical link for
describing vertical integration as one option along a continuum of corporate alternatives for
achieving vertical control. The last piece of theoretic apparatus needed to model and understand
vertical integration is the ability to predict and even prescribe alternative organizational forms for
achieving control along a vertical control continuum. It is to this important task that the last
section of the paper is devoted.
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A Framework for Predicting Organizational Form
While the great insight of the agency theory perspective is that vertical contracting and
vertical ownership are theoretically equivalent, the agency perspective fails to consider the
importance of asset specificity in executing an optimal vertical integration strategy. A transaction
cost approach (Williamson, 1979) provides insight into the key role of asset specificity, but
neglects the interactive effects highlighted by agency theory. Combining these two perspectives
enables us to make predictions and offer prescriptions on the make-or-buy decision.
Table 4 summarizes the extensive subset of the vertical integration literature that deals
directly with three variables that are central to the agency and transaction cost perspectives. In
general, the agency perspective emphasizes information asymmetry issues.
Insert Table 4 about here
A significant aspect of information asymmetry in organizations is the
problem of rewarding effort in team production (Jones, 1984). This leads to
the so-called "non-separability problem" (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). If reward cannot be based
on output, a manager is necessary to monitor behavior or effort. A second important agency
theory variable concerns knowledge of the transformation process or task programmability
(Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979). Low task programmability reduces the effectiveness of
monitoring. As Table 4 shows, a good deal of the literature on the vertical integration decision
has been concerned with such uncertainties, and the results in general suggest that as uncertainty
increases, vertical integration is increasingly likely.
The transaction cost approach emphasizes asset specificity as the fundamental variable in
determining the optimal vertical integration strategy (Williamson, 1979). When assets are not
closely tied to a specific strategy, the theory suggests that market and informal means of
coordination will be preferable corporate strategies. Vertical integration makes sense only when
assets are idiosyncratic and closely tied to a specific strategy.
The integration of the transaction cost and agency approaches yields task
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programmability, nonseparability, and asset specificity as three determinants of vertical
integration strategy. To highlight the interactive effects of these variables, consider each in a
dichotomous (low, high) form, as shown in Table 5.
Insert Table 5 about here
This table suggests a synthetic theory of corporate vertical control. Drawing together empirical
evidence from two fields of inquiry—strategy and economics—and applying insights from two
theoretical perspectives—transaction cost and agency theory— it offers a more detailed approach
to the corporate control option than previously available.
In its simplified form, the theoretic perspective can be expressed in eight different
circumstances which might face the corporation. When productivity of the individual is easily
measured and asset specificity is low (case 1), the market mechanism (spot market contracting)
should run smoothly. Vertical integration can add very little to this scenario; it is unlikely to be
considered, and is highly unlikely to be cost effective if tried. When asset specificity is high but
nonseparability is low (case 2), some form of long-term contracting will be required. Payment by
outcome will suffice, however, since productivity is separable. Where task programmability is
low and nonseparability problems are high (case 3), relational contracting such as joint ventures
may be necessary. However, asset specificity is also low in this scenario. Unified governance
(vertical financial ownership) is not required.
The worst case scenario for choosing the market mechanism as a strategy of vertical
control occurs when monitoring behavior is not effective (low task programmability), observing
output is not satisfactory (high nonseparability), and asset specificity is high (case 4). Unified
governance or some type of clan relationship (Ouchi, 1980) is predicted in situations presenting
this mix of variables. The best case scenario for choosing the market mechanism, on the other
hand, occurs when measurement of input (high task programmability) and output (low
nonseparability) are effective and asset specificity is low (case 5). Here spot market contracting
is the predicted organizational choice.
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With high asset specificity (case 6) some type of relational contracting will be necessary.
But since monitoring of effort is effective here, relational contracting will suffice to minimize
opportunistic behavior. When transactions involve high task programability, high nonseparability
and low asset specificity (case 7) we can use Alchian and Demsetz1 (1972) model where a monitor
is needed to ascertain individual effort. The inside contracting system (Williamson, 1975) or
quasi-firm (Eccles, 1981) also illustrate the "manager as monitor" model. Finally, vertical
financial ownership (unified governance) is predicted when asset specificity (sunk cost) is high
and nonseparability problems are high (case 8). Since task programmability is high, monitoring
of effort will be effective.
Conclusion
A great deal of attention has been given to diversification as a basic corporate strategy
(Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989). This paper suggests that vertical integration, or more broadly
vertical control, is an option with similar complexities deserving increased research attention.
Recent efforts by industrial organization and strategic management researchers to expand our
theoretical and empirical understanding of vertical control (which includes vertical contracting,
networks, and vertical merger) has been exciting and fruitful. We have begun to understand
complex phenomena that were ignored or treated as strategic puzzles a decade ago. On the other
hand, at present this work is somewhat disjoint, with individual researchers tending to respond to
increasingly specific debates about the details of different vertical integration scenarios.
The underlying proposition of this paper is that new theoretical insight is most likely to
take place at the interface of the strategy and economics literature and be achieved by more
broadly conceptualizing vertical integration. More specifically, new insights into vertical
integration may be found by considering vertical mergers as one end of a vertical control
continuum that also includes vertical markets and vertical contracting. Even more broadly, it has
been argued that the theory of vertical integration and the theory of the firm are isomorphic.
Expanding the horizons of discourse in this way gives us access to a much richer set of
theoretic tools. Insights from the agency literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976),
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the organizational economics literature (Barney & Ouchi, 1986), the property rights literature
(Alchian, 1982; Jones, 1983; Grossman & Hart, 1986) and a dynamic resource-based theory of the
firm (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Penrose, 1959; Rubin, 1973; Wernerfelt, 1984) become available for
enhancing our knowledge of vertical integration strategy.
The key theoretic advance of the paper is achieved by integrating the agency literature
with transaction cost ideas found in the organizational economics literature. The organizational
economics literature has underemphasized information asymmetries. The agency literature relies
on assumptions about information asymmetries and risk aversion (Eisenhardt, 1989) but ignores
asset specificity, a topic given considerable attention in transaction cost analysis. A synthesis of
the two perspectives is used to predict and prescribe the optimal vertical integration strategy. The
choice among vertical control strategies outlined in the specific model depends upon the degree to
which non-separable team effort is required, the ability to program tasks and the level of asset
specificity. Different mixes of these variables lead the firm to scenarios that extend from spot
market contracting to complete financial control via vertical integration.
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Table 1 Some Advantages of Vertical Integration
(1) Transaction cost
considerations
(2) Strategic considerations
(i) Capture tax incentives (i) Increase entry
barriers
(ii) Redress market failures (ii) Price squeeze smaller
competitors from market
(iii) Adapt to high uncertainty,
and/or high frequency
(iii) Circumvent regulation
(iv) Avoid costs associated
with asset specificity
(iv) Maintain oligop-
olistic discipline
(v) Create economies of scope
(3) Output and/or input
price discrepancies
(4) Uncertainty about
costs and/or prices
(i) Successive monopoly
& successive oligopoly
(i) Asymmetric information
ii) Bilateral monopoly (ii) Demand uncertainty
(iii) Upstream monopoly (iii) Measurement uncertainty
(iv) Price Discrimination (iv) Quality uncertainty
(v) Technological uncertainty
(vi) Appropriate R&D spillovers
(vii) Trade technology
Table 2 Some Disadvantages of Vertical Integration
(1) Bureaucratic costs (2) Strategic costs
(i) Diminishing returns to
management
(i) Less access to informa-
tion from suppliers
(ii) Higher cost of internal
organization
(ii) Increased sunk costs
in specialized assets
(iii) Increase in number of
management functions
(iii) Stronger ties to weak
adjacent industries
(iv) Lost economies of scope
due to poor organization
(iv) Lost flexibility
(High exit barriers)
(3) Production costs (4) Long-run dynamic costs
(i) Lost economies of scale (i) Lack of direct
competitive pressures
(ii) Obsolete technologies (ii) Internal persistence
bias
(iii) High overhead cost
(Capital drain)
(iii) Internal expansion
bias
(iv) Capacity imbalance (iv) Problems with
divestment
Table 3 Motives for Vertical Control
Motive Paper suggesting vertical
financial ownership
Paper suggesting
vertical contract
(2) Strategic Considerations
Entry
Barriers
(Williamson 1971)
(Porter 1980)
Exclusive Dealing Contracts
(Comanor & Freeh 1985)
Circumvent-
regulation
(Dayan, 1975) Transfer pricing via equity
joint venture (Blois, 1972)
Maintaining
oligopolistic
discipline
(Adams & Dirlam, 1964) Tying contracts or resale
price maintenance
(Burstein, 1960a)
(3) Output and/or Input Price Discrepancies
Successive
Monopoly
(Spengler, 1950)
(Greenhut & Ohta, 1976)
Franchise fee or resale
price maintenance (Rey
& Tirole, 1986)
Bilateral
Monopoly
(Williamson, 1971) Contract bargaining
(Machlup & Taber, 1960)
Upstream
Monopoly
(Vernon and Graham, 1971)
(Schmalensee, 1973)
Tying contract
(Burstein, 1960a)
Price Dis-
crimination
(Crandall, 1968)
(Perry, 1980)
Tying contract
(Burstein, 1960b)
(Blackstone, 1975)
Territorial restric-
tions coupled with re-
sale price maintenance
(Phillips & Mahoney,1985)
(4) Uncertainties about Costs and/or Prices
Reduce asym-
metric uncer-
tainty
(Arrow, 1975) Vertical contract
(Teece, 1982)
Reduce or
transfer risk
(Carlton, 1979) Long-term contract
(Carlton, 1979)
Assure
Supply
(Demand
uncertainty)
(Walker & Weber, 1984) Collateral (Benjamin, 1978)
Deferred rebates (Gold-
berg, 1979)
Control
quality and
services
(Harrigan, 1986) Exclusive territories
(Goldberg, 1982)
Resale price main-
tenance (Marvel &
McCafferty, 1984;
Phillips & Mahoney, 1985)
Reduce
shirking
(Measurement
Uncertainty)
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972) Relational contract
(Williamson, 1979)
Reduce tech-
nological un-
certainty
(Teece, 1982) Equity joint venture
(Hennart, 1988a)
Appropriate
R&D spill-
overs
(Phillips, 1983) Vertical contracts
(Evans & Grossman, 1983)
Trading of
Technology
(Arrow, 1971) Equity joint venture
(Kogut, 1988)
Table 4 Empirical Research on the Vertical Integration Decision froi
Thirteen Key Empirical Studies*
Study/Sample/
Methodology
VI=Vertical
Integration
U =Uncertain
AS=Asset Specificity
Measures Results
Anderson & VI
Schmittlein
(1984)
U
16 electronic
component
manufacturers
Survey data
Logit analysis
AS
use of direct
sales force
expected deviation
between forecast and
actual sales in the
next year, expressed
as a percentage
{volume uncertainty)
the likelihood of
perceived difficulty
of measuring the
results of individual
salespeople equitably
{measurement uncer-
tainty)
average of six (stand-
ardized) variables
representing manager's
perceptions of the
importance of human
capital specificity
Volume uncertainty
had no statistically
significant effect
on the likelihood
of vertical integra-
tion.
Measurement uncer-
tainty increased
vertical integra-
tion at a statisti-
cally significant
level.
Asset specificity
increased the like-
lihood of the adoption
of the vertical
integration strategy
at a statistically sig-
nificant level.
Anderson
(1985)
13 electronic
component
manufacturers
Survey data
Logit analysis
VI
U
AS
use of direct
sales force
difficulty of
evaluating
performance
{measurement
uncertainty)
Company specificity
and brand-specific
know-how required.
The more difficult
it was to evaluate
sales performance
the greater the like-
lihood of vertical
integration
(statistically sig-
nicant).
The greater the
human capital asset
specificity the
higher the like-
lihood of vertical
integration
(statistically
significant).
Armour &
Teece
(1980)
U.S.petroleum
industry for
the 1954-1975
period
Regression
analysis
VI
AS
number of
primary
production
stages
firm's
expenditure
on basic,
applied, or
development
research
Vertical integration
is significantly
associated (at the
95 % level) with
basic and applied
research expenditures.
Human capital asset
specificity of
technological know-
how necessitates
vertical integration.
Caves &
Bradburd
(1988)
83 U.S.
Industries
for 1975
Regression
analysis
VI
AS
input-output
measure on the
distribution of
each industry's
shipments among
other industries
(a) joint fewness
of sellers & buyers
(b) capital inten-
sity that is poten-
tially sunk and
specific to the
industry
Small numbers
bargaining and
firm-specific
sunk capital were
positively assoc-
iated with vertical
integration at a
positive and
statistically
significant level.
Harrigan
(1986)
192 firms
from 16
industries
from 1960-
1981
Chi-square
tests
VI
U
measures of
degree, stages,
breadth and
form of VI
changes in sales
growth
{volume uncertainty)
years to obsol-
esce technology
{technological
uncertainty}
Both volume
uncertainty and
technological
uncertainty led
to less vertical
integration at a
statistically
significant level
John & Weitz VI
(1988)
87 industrial AS
good firms
Survey data U
Regression analysis
Logit analysis
percent sold
directly to
end users
human capital
asset specificity
average response of
5 items including
industry, market
share, and sales
forecasting volatil-
ity
Vertical inte-
gration was
positively and
significantly
related to asset
specificity and
environmental un-
certainty.
Production costs
were not stat-
istically signif-
icant.
Joskow
(1985)
277 observations
of contracts or
complete owner-
ship by coal-
burning electric
generating
plants
VI
AS
utility
ownership
of mines
mine-mouth
plants which
involved site
specificity,
physical asset
specificity and
dedicated assets
While 85% of
the coal used
to generate
electricity is
supplied by the
market mechanism,
virtually all of
the mine-mouth
mines are owned
by utilities
Levy
(1985)
69 firms
representing
37 different
industries
for the years,
1958, 1963,
1967, 1972
regression
analysis
VI
u
AS
value-added/sales
(enterprise-based census
log of firms sales
regressed on a time
trend, the variance
of the error term is
used as a measure of
uncertainty
Volume uncertainty,
data) fewness of firms,
and research inten-
sity each increased
the likelihood of
vertical integration
at a statistically
significant level
small numbers of firms
and the intensity of
research and development
expenditures
MacDonald
(1985)
79 three and
four digit
producer goods
industries for
1977
regression
analysis
VI
AS
the proportion of ship-
ments from manufactur-
ing industries that are
made to affiliated units
{U.S. Census of Manu-
facturers}
small numbers (high buyer
or seller concentration)
capital intensity, which
is measured by the ratio
of fixed assets to ship-
ments
The use of vertical
integration is more
prevalent in capital
intensive industries
and in those four digit
characterized by
high levels of
buyer or seller
concentration at
a statistically
significant level
MacMillan
.
Hambrick
.
&
Pennings
(1986)
178 consumer
99 capital
275 component
businesses
regression
analysis
VI
U
AS
(1 -purchases/costs of
goods sold)
Four-year mean absolute
deviation of served
market sales from served
market growth rate
Gross book value of
plant and equipment
per dollar of revenues
Volume instability
led to an increased
likelihood of
backward integration
for consumer, capital,
and component
supplier businesses at
a statistically
significant level.
Asset specificity/
capital intensity
increased the like-
lihood of backward
integration for
consumer, capital,
and component
supplier businesses at
a statistically
significant level.
Masten
(1984)
1,887 component
specifications
for the aero-
space industry
Maximum
Likelihood
procedure
VI
U
AS
make or buy
survey data
if the component
is highly
complex
if the component
is highly
specialized
Components that
were complex and
specialized were
more likely to
be made in-house
at a statistically
significant level.
Monteverde
& Teece
(1982)
Ford &
General
Motors
for 1976,
133 auto
components
probit
analysis
VI
AS
80 percent or more
of the component
requirements produced
in-house
amount of engineering
effort required in
designing a part
part made specifically
for a single assembler
Backward integration
was more likely
when the engineering
effort required to
design a part was
high, suggesting
the importance of
human capital asset
specificity.
Backward integration
was also more likely
when the parts were
firm-specific.
Walker &
Weber
(1984; 1987)
60 components
of an auto-
mobile manu-
facturer
LISREL estima-
tion using un-
weighted least
squares
VI
u
make or buy decision
Volume uncertainty
(a) expected volume
fluctuations
(b) uncertainty of
volume estimates
Technological uncertainty
(a) frequency of changes
in product specifica-
tions
(b) probability of tech-
nological improve-
ments
High volume uncer-
tainty leads to a
make decision in
low competition
(but not high
competition) markets
Technological
uncertainty has no
influence on make-or
buy decisions when
supplier competition
is low but leads to a
buy decision when
competition is high.
Only the results relevant to the relationship between asset specificity, uncertainty and the
adoption of vertical integration are briefly summarized here. For details, see the original
references.
Table 5
Predicting the Organizational Form of Vertical Control
Task Programability Nonseparability Asset
Problem Specificity
Case 1:
Case 2:
Case 3:
Case 4:
Case 5:
Case 6:
Case 7:
Case 8:
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low High
Low High
High Low
High Low
High High
High High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Predicted
Organizational
Form
Spot market
contract
Relational
contract
Relational
contract
Unified
governance
Spot market
contract
Relational
contract
Inside
contract
Unified
governance
Joseph T. Mahoney (Ph.D. Wharton School) is Assistant Professor
of Strategic Management at the University of Illinois-Urbana.
Correspondence regarding this article can be sent to him at the
College of Commerce and Business Administration, 350 Commerce
Building (West), 1206 South Sixth Street, Champaign, IL 61820.
The author thanks Ned Bowman, Jerry Goodstein, Bruce Kogut, and
Ming-Je Tang for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
Special thanks are due to Anne Huff for her comments and
suggestions.
The author acknowledges the support of the Reginald Jones Center
at Wharton and the University of Illinois at Urbana.



